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Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick has been described as a “watershed” in Canadian ad­
ministrative law.1 Very few law students and practitioners of the discipline are now 
unaware that the standard of “patent unreasonableness” has disappeared. The simpli­
fication of standards of review has caught the eye of many commentators, almost to 
the extent that it would seem that Dunsmuir would appear to deal exclusively with that 
issue. Nevertheless, their conclusion is that in relation to judicial deference, Dunsmuir 
has not really changed that much.2 Whether Dunsmuir leads to less judicial deference 
because of the disappearance of “patent unreasonableness” or more because “patent 
unreasonableness” is now diluted into a larger doctrine of reasonableness falls into 
one of the great perennial inquiries of administrative law: what is reasonableness?
While commentators have centered their discussions on the issue of stan­
dards of review, it is rather the less discussed aspect of the decision relating to the 
rights of non-unionized public servants to a hearing prior to dismissal that could have 
important implications for Canadian administrative law. Dunsmuir is important be­
cause it changes a fundamental rule—notably the right to a hearing prior to dismissal 
—that had been developing in Canadian administrative law, in parallel with other ju­
risdictions, over several decades. Until now, Canadian administrative law offered a 
pragmatic and nuanced answer to this problem through the doctrine of natural jus-
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tice. However, in Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court ruled that civil servants, being mostly 
contractual employees, are subject to ordinary contract and not administrative law.
1. The Facts and Legal Issues
Following a competition organised under the Civil Service Act (CSA), David Dunsmuir 
began work on 25 February 2002 as legal advisor at the Department of Justice of New 
Brunswick.3 Three weeks later, on 14 March 2002, by Order-in-Council, he was ap­
pointed to the offices of Clerk of the Court of Queen’s Bench, Trial Division, Adminis­
trator of the Court of Queen’s Bench, Family Division, and Clerk of the Probate Court 
of New Brunswick, all for the Judicial District of Fredericton. Dunsmuir’s employment 
was far from trouble free. His probationary period was extended from six to twelve 
months. During his employment, Dunsmuir was reprimanded on three separate occa­
sions, the last being in July 2004 by his regional director who threatened Dunsmuir with 
termination should his organization and output not improve. Dunsmuir answered that 
he would obtain legal advice and would not meet with her to discuss the matter further.
During his evaluation, dated 19 August 2004, the Regional Director in­
formed Dunsmuir that he did not fulfill the needs of his employer. The following day, 
a letter of termination was sent to his lawyer, informing Dunsmuir that his employ­
ment was terminated as of 31 December of that year, but that he would not have 
to go to work in the meantime. On 3 February 2005, an order in council revoked 
Dunsmuir’s appointment to the Court. In the meantime, Dunsmuir lodged a griev­
ance under the Public Service Labour Relations Act (“PSLRA ”), arguing that his 
employer had not made known its reasons for dissatisfaction; that he was not given 
any opportunity to respond to any of his employer’s concerns; that his employer’s 
actions in terminating him were without notice, due process or procedural fairness; 
and that the length of the notice period was inadequate.4 The grievances were all de­
nied and Dunsmuir referred his grievances to the adjudicator under that same Act.
According to the Province, termination of Dunsmuir’s contract was only 
limited by a duty to give reasonable notice. Dunsmuir argued that he could only 
be terminated with cause, which had not been the case. According to him, he had 
been unreasonably disciplined by the Province. The adjudicator ruled that Dun­
smuir had in fact been terminated with cause, but not for disciplinary reasons. The 
adjudicator recognised that the Province could terminate Dunsmuir’s employ­
ment with notice or immediately with cause, but could not do so without providing 
Dunsmuir with a proper hearing. Dunsmuir’s appeal was therefore allowed; being 
an office holder at pleasure, he was reinstated for not having had a proper hearing.
The central legal issue that developed, however, was not Dunsmuir’s right 
to a hearing, but the extent to which his statutory rights of appeal allowed the adju­
3 Civil Service Act, S.N.B. 1984, c. C-5.1 [CSA].
4 Public Service Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-25 [PSLRA].
dicator to inquire into the cause of his termination. The adjudicator stated that the 
employer could not rely on its contractual right to end the relationship at will, and 
thereby weaken Dunsmuir’s right of appeal. The legal uncertainty arose because of 
a conflict between the PSA and the PSLRA. “Employees” within the PSLRA may file 
a grievance in relation to dismissal and disciplinary measures. Such grievances can 
be appealed to an adjudicator. The powers of the adjudicator are defined as follows:
Where an adjudicator determines that an employee has been discharged or 
otherwise disciplined by the employer for cause and the collective agreement 
or arbitral award does not contain a specific penalty for the infraction that re­
sulted in the employee being discharged or otherwise disciplined, the adju­
dicator may substitute such other penalty for the discharge or discipline as to 
the adjudicator seems just and reasonable in all the circumstances.5
That being said, the terms of dismissal of persons qualifying as “civil ser­
vants” are set out in section 20 of the CSA, which provides that “Subject to the 
provisions of this Act or any other Act, termination of the employment of a deputy 
head or an employee shall be governed by the ordinary rules of contract.” Ordinary 
rules of contract law allow for employment at will, subject to reasonable notice or 
severance pay in lieu. This right of termination still has to be read in conjunction 
with the PSLRA, which provided certain government officials with statutory rights 
of appeal. The problem that arose from these statutory regimes was concerned the 
powers of the adjudicator to overturn the government’s decision of dismissal.
The fact that the adjudicator’s powers have been extended to non-union- 
ized civil servants is important because collective agreements have allowed union­
ized civil servants to be protected against dismissal without cause. The wording of 
s. 97(2.1), however, is not so clear and in no way “cuts and pastes” the standard 
protection against dismissal without cause found in most collective agreements.6
The question is: does s. 92(201) provide protection against termination with­
out cause? Moreover, to what extent does this section override the CSA which provides 
that employee rights upon termination are those of ordinary contract law?
2. Judicial Review of the Adjudicator’s Decision
The Province applied for judicial review of the Adjudicator’s decision, arguing that 
he did not have jurisdiction to qualify the nature of the termination. What followed, 
however, was a debate on the appropriate standard of review to be applied in the 
case rather than a discussion about Dunsmuir’s right to a proper hearing. These dis­
cussions centered on the assumption that Dunsmuir was an office holder “at plea­
sure” whose right to notice had been extended by s. 20 of the CSA, and whose
5 PSLRA ibid s. 97(2.1).
6 PSLRA, ibid.
procedural rights were set out comprehensively in legislation. Under this assump­
tion, procedural fairness was necessarily extant given Dunsmuir’s rights of appeal.
In spite of a privative clause, Rideout J qualified the issue as one of statutory 
interpretation and therefore subject to a correctness standard of review.7 On the merits, 
Rideout J stated that the Adjudicator had made an error of law by looking at the reasons 
for Dunsmuir’s termination. Section 97(2.1) did not allow him to look into the reasons 
of Dunsmuir’s termination since the employer had not sought any. As employable “at 
pleasure”, Dunsmuir was not entitled to a full hearing. His rights under the PSLRA 
were procedural in nature, not substantive. As a result, the adjudicator’s ruling look­
ing into the reasons for dismissal was patently unreasonable and accordingly quashed.
On appeal, Robertson JA confirmed Rideout J’s ruling while stating that the 
standard of review was that of “reasonableness simpliciter”.8 In doing so, he stat­
ed that under s. 20 of the CSA, the employer was entitled to terminate Dunsmuir as 
in ordinary employment contracts. In his view, the Adjudicator was not entitled to 
evaluate the appropriateness of Dunsmuir’s termination where the employer did not 
invoke any disciplinary reasons. Dunsmuir’s only recourse upon termination would 
be to invoke discrimination or illicit grounds of termination which was not the case 
at hand. The Court also stated that given that the parties had conceded Dunsmuir’s 
status as a contractual employee, it was unnecessary to deal with Dunsmuir’s right 
as an “at pleasure” appointee. As for procedural fairness, Dunsmuir’s right of griev­
ance was itself a fulfillment of his employer’s duty of procedural fairness. Impor­
tantly, the Court of Appeal did not see the case as one of natural justice. In its words:
Finally, the issue of procedural fairness does not arise in this case.
Mr. Dunsmuir’s employment was terminated with notice and he ex­
ercised his right to grieve, albeit with respect to the length of 
the notice period. In these circumstances, a finding that the fair­
ness duty has been breached has no legal foundation.9
The Supreme Court unanimously confirmed the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal.10 Faced with uncertainty regarding the appropriate standard of review, the 
Supreme Court decided to propose a general overhaul of the issue, stating that there 
ought to be two standards of review — correctness and reasonableness.11 Much discus­
sion was given to methods of judicially reviewing administrative action such as the
7 See the ruling of Rideout J: (2005), 293 R.N.B. (2e) 5,43 C.C.E.L. (3d) 205, [2005] A.N.B. no 327 
(QL), 2005 CarswellNB 444,2005 NBBR 270.
8 New Brunswick Court of Appeal (Turnbull, Daigle and Robertson JJ) (2006), 7 R.N.B. (2e) 151,265 
D.L.R. (4th) 609,44 Admin. L.R. (4th) 92,48 C.C.E.L. (3d) 196, [2006] CLLC at para 220-030, [2006] 
A.N.B. no 118 (QL), 2006 CarswellNB 156, 2006 NBC A 27.
9 Ibid. at para. 34.
10 Bastarache and Lebel JJ, McLachlin, Fish and Abella JJ concurring.
11 Mullan, Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para. 34.
arbitrator’s decision.12 In spite of being divided on the standard of review, the court was 
unanimous on the point that Dunsmuir was not entitled to a hearing, as he had claimed. 
As provided in s. 20 of the CSA, Dunsmuir was subject to the ordinary rules of con­
tract and hence reasonable notice or severance pay in lieu.13 More importantly, not all 
civil servants, whether they are under contract or statutory office holders, are entitled 
to a hearing unless it is expressly provided for in their contract, collective agreement 
or otherwise. Moreover, “(w)here the dismissal results in a breach of contract, the pub­
lic employee will have access to ordinary contractual remedies”.14 As a result, Dun­
smuir was not entitled to any additional hearing other than that provided by statute.
Despite saying that Dunsmuir should have utilized “ordinary contrac­
tual remedies”, the Court included much discussion on the standard of review be­
fore ultimately concluding that the standard of review in this case was reason­
ableness.15 The Court also held that administrative law should have nothing to do 
with the resolution of this case or future cases involving public servant dismissals.
While jurists have debated Dunsmuir'’s apparently simplied standards of re­
view at length, much less attention has been given to the issue of procedural rights for 
public servants. As I hope to demonstrate in this comment, the issue of standard of re­
view should have been secondary to resolve Dunsmuir’s legal argument. In the end, if 
judicial review is simplified to two standards instead of three, that is all the better, but 
rather than debate the meaning of reasonableness, something that has perplexed legal 
professionals of all stripes and that will certainly not be resolved with the Dunsmuir 
case, I propose to turn my attention to the problem of procedural fairness and demon­
strate how the simplification of standard of review analysis conceals the much greater 
problem of defining the rights and legal status of government employees.
PUBLIC SERVANTS’ STATUTORY RIGHTS OF APPEAL AND LIMITATIONS
THEREOF BY CONTRACTUAL STATUS
The first difficulty with the Dunsmuir case concerns the scope of the Adju­
dicator’s jurisdiction over the dispute between David Dunsmuir and his employer. 
The very existence of such jurisdiction, however, was contingent on Dunsmuir’s sta­
tus as a public service employee. This leads to a second problem: the court record 
at every level is silent about how to establish Dunsmuir’s status. Dunsmuir’s status 
has important consequences on his rights of grievance and adjudication under the 
PSLRA and ultimately what would have been his right to a hearing at common law. 
Moreover, New Brunswick public service legislation is complex, and persons such as 
David Dunsmuir have unwittingly been allowed to fall through the cracks not only
12 Ibid, at paras 27-76.
13 Termination, however, is subject to an obligation of good faith. See Wallace v. United Grain Growers 
Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701 and RBC Dominion Securities Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Canada Inc., 2008 SCC 54.
14 Mullan, Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para. 113.
15 Ibid.; ibid. at para. 71.
by the courts, but more importantly by the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick.
3. Jurisdiction of the Adjudicator over Termination of Contractual Relationships
At the outset, it is not clear why the adjudicator was not allowed to inquire 
into the cause of Dunsmuir’s dismissal. In the Court’s opinion, if the employer does 
not raise any reasons for terminating the contract, the arbitrator does not have juris­
diction to inquire into the cause of dismissal. The adjudicator can only take notice 
of the dismissal and determine whether appropriate notice has been given.16 Allow­
ing the adjudicator “to inquire into the reasons for discharge where notice is given 
and, under s. 97(2.1), substitute a penalty that he or she determines just and reason­
able in the circumstances, creates a requirement that the employer show cause be­
fore dismissal”. 17 The majority continued: “There can be no justification for this; 
no reasonable interpretation can lead to that result.”18 However, as Mullan stated,19 
the provision could be interpreted—and was in fact interpreted—as stating that non- 
unionized employees dismissed for any reason should be entitled to appeal their 
dismissal under the PSLRA. The Adjudicator could then determine whether there 
was cause, and should he find that there was none that he should be able to order 
the employee’s reinstatement. The Adjudicator could thus examine the existence 
of cause rather than its justification.20 According to this interpretation, the employ­
er could not (1) invoke a non-existent cause nor (2) dismiss the employee without 
cause if in fact there would be a cause for dismissal. Such an interpretation is en­
tirely within the reasonable possibility left open by the combination of s. 97(2.1) of 
the PSLRA and s. 20 of the CSA. This is all the more possible since the standard of 
review the majority determined at the outset was not correctness but reasonableness.
Indeed, s. 97(2.1) of the PSLRA provides that certain non unionized em­
ployees may appeal their discharge for cause and that the adjudicator may “substi­
tute such other penalty for the discharge or discipline as to the adjudicator seems 
just and reasonable in all the circumstances.” It would have been pointless to allow 
non-unionized employees to appeal a dismissal for cause by simply allowing the em­
ployer to circumvent s. 97(2.1) of the PSLRA by not spelling out the cause.21 While 
there may be reasons to prevent the unionization of some public servants, there is no 
reason to automatically exclude them from protection from dismissal without cause.
16 Ibid. at para. 75. See s. 97(2.1) PSLRA, supra note 4.
17 Mullan, Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para. 75.
18 Ibid.
19 Mullan, Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at 137.
20 See also New Brunswick Power Corp. v. Hadfield [1999] N.B.J. No. 477 where the Court recognized 
the adjudicator’s jurisdiction and “patently reasonable” exercise of power to order reinstatement of a non- 
unionized employee who had been discharged.
21 We should add that s. 97(2.1) was added to the PSLRA, supra note 4 in 1990, the same year as Knight 
v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653 [Knight] broadened the applicability of 
procedural to select contractual employees dismissible without cause.
Moreover, s. 20 of the CSA does state that the employer’s right to terminate is subject 
to the provisions of any other Act. Can it really be said that an Adjudicator’s decision 
and reasoning “does not fall within the range of acceptable outcomes that are defen­
sible in respect of the facts and the law”?22 On a broader level, it is worth question­
ing now what exactly will be the value of providing public servants with statutory 
rights of appeal against dismissal, whether they be subject to dismissal for cause or 
otherwise. From the reasoning offered, it appears that the only remaining function of 
these bodies is to determine whether or not adequate damages have been awarded.23
4. Did the Adjudicator have Jurisdiction over David Dunsmuir?
There are other, more fundamental reasons to question the adjudicator’s juris­
diction. Neither party to the dispute appears to have questioned the applicabil­
ity of the PSLRA or the CSA to Dunsmuir. Rather, each assumed that because he 
was recruited pursuant to a competition organized under the CSA he was entitled to 
file a grievance under the PSLRA. Rights of grievance and adjudication under that 
Act are not available to all public servants but reserved for “employees”.24 That 
Act defines “employee” succinctly as “a person employed in the Public Service”.25
However, things are not that simple and it is difficult to see from the re­
cord on what basis Dunsmuir was allowed to proceed with a grievance and a request 
for adjudication. A government lawyer such as Dunsmuir might be excluded as “(g) 
a person employed in a managerial or confidential capacity”, or on the grounds that 
he is “a person appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council under an Act of 
the Legislature to a statutory position described in that Act and to whom the Civil 
Service Act does not apply”.26 Such persons would not be entitled to file a griev­
ance under the PSLRA nor to request adjudication thereunder. The question there­
fore becomes how these exclusions were circumvented in Dunsmuir’s case.
The record of the Court of Queen’s Bench shows that Dunsmuir was ini­
tially engaged following a competition under the CSA as a Legal Officer for the Court 
Services Division.27 Moreover, the CSA would apply to Dunsmuir because he was 
employed by the Department of Justice.28 However, three weeks after his initial en­
gagement by the Department of Justice as Legal Officer in the Fredericton Court Ser­
vices Branch, he was appointed by order in council Clerk for the Court of Queen’s 
Bench (Trial and Family Divisions) and Clerk for the Probate Court.29 The power to 
appoint such persons and their terms of employment are not provided in the CSA but
22 Mullan, Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para. 139.
23 See below “Judicial Remediation”.
24 PSLRA, supra note 4 s. 100.1(2) and 100.1(3).
25 Ibid. s. 1.
26 Ibid. s. l(a)-(g).
27 Mullan, Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para. 3.
28 The CSA, as stated in its regulations, applies to the Department of Justice: CSA, supra note 3 s. 1; 
General Regulation - Civil Service Act, N.B. Reg. 93-137, s. 3.
29 Mullan, Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para. 2.
pursuant to the province’s Judicature Act (JA) and the Probate Court Act (PCA).30
There is a strong argument that his appointment as Clerk of the Court of 
Queen’s Bench and Probate Court brought him outside the scope of the CSA and PSL- 
RA and under those of the JA and PC A. This crucial change in Dunsmuir’s status and 
function appears to have been ignored by all the parties to the dispute. It is true that the 
PSLRA does refer to persons appointed under another act and to whom the CSA does 
not apply.31 Thus, it might be thought that Dunsmuir was appointed under the JA and 
PCA while the CSA might continue to apply to him, thereby retaining his status as “em­
ployee” under the PSLRA. However, “appointment under” an Act has generally meant 
that the person appointed thereunder is subject to that Act. Any additional legislation 
governing the employment of such an individual would have to be clear and explicit. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see which exact provisions of the CSA are supposed to apply 
to Dunsmuir given that the terms of his appointment, his responsibilities and functions 
are described in the JA and PCA, not anywhere in the CSA. Dunsmuir’s hiring process 
was organized according to the CSA, but this seems to have taken place to facilitate the 
selection of possible clerks among a pool of candidates. Once appointed as Clerk and 
Deputy Registrar, all the terms of Dunsmuir’s employment are set out in the JA and 
the PCA (conditions for appointment, oath of office, functions and remuneration).32 
Dunsmuir’s probationary period seems to have been borrowed from s. 23(1) of the 
CSA, although nothing in the PCA or the JA requires a probationary period and the 
application of such a period does not necessarily extend the applicability of those Acts. 
The administrative uncertainty of Dunsmuir’s position as Clerk might have explained 
his contacting the Chief Justice of the Court rather than his Regional Director.33
It is likely that Dunsmuir was administratively responsible to his Regional 
Director in the Department of Justice while nevertheless, following his appointment 
as Clerk and Deputy Registrar, being subject to the JA and PCA and therefore beyond 
the scope of the CSA. New Brunswick legislation regarding court registrars and clerks 
is very different from other Canadian jurisdictions, which seem to have updated their 
public service legislation to give broader and more coherent coverage to court staff. 
Generally speaking, in other provinces the functions of Registrar and Clerk are not 
described in the “ Judicature Acts” (or equivalent) of those provinces, as is the case in 
New Brunswick. These updates provide them with much greater certainty as to their 
status as public servants and the benefits they receive under public service legislation.
For instance, in Ontario, the law states explicitly that Clerks and Registrars
30 Judicature Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. J-2, ss. 61 (Deputy Registrar of the Court of Queen’s Bench and 
Court of Appeal) and 68(1)- trial division and 68(2) -  family division; Probate Court: Probate Court Act, 
C. P-17.1, s. 12(1). See Order in Council 2002 -  101 and 2002-102 of March 14,2002, The Royal Gazette 
-April 17 2002 a t429.
31 Supra note 28.
32 “A clerk or an administrator shall be paid for all services performed by him such fees as the Lieutenant- 
Governor in Council may prescribe.” See S. 70(3) JA, s. 12(4) PCA.
33 Mullan, Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 4.
are appointed under the Public Service o f Ontario Act, 2006.34 This is also the case in 
British Columbia, in the Supreme Court of Canada and Quebec.35 A second category 
of jurisdiction does not even mention the appointment of court registrars and clerks 
in its “Judicature A c f  or equivalent. Alberta, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, the Federal 
Courts, and Saskatchewan do not refer to Clerks and the Registrar in their “Judica­
ture Acts” (or equivalent).36 This omission suggests that Court Registrars and Clerks 
are employed under general public service legislation. A final category of jurisdic­
tions are those that mention court registrars and clerks in their “Judicature Acts” (or 
equivalent) and describe their terms of appointment, powers and responsibilities there­
in. This is the category in which New Brunswick finds itself, along with Newfound­
land and Labrador, the Northwest Territories, Prince Edward Island and the Yukon.37 
Viewed from this perspective, it is easy to see that New Brunswick has not followed 
the general Canadian trend of withdrawing Court Registrars and Clerks from special 
Judicature legislation. Instead, New Brunswick follows an administrative practice 
where Court Clerks and Registrars are treated as though they are subject to gener­
al public service legislation although they have not amended the relevant statutes.
The next exception that Dunsmuir might have fallen into is s. 1(g) PSLRA 
which excludes persons employed in a “confidential capacity”.38 However, s. 100.1(1) 
of that Act provides a right of grievance to persons not qualifying as “employees” 
“but for the fact that the person is a person employed in a managerial or confidential 
capacity.” Although this was not discussed in any published judicial proceedings, we 
can speculate that Dunsmuir might have been allowed to file a grievance and proceed 
to adjudication because it was assumed that the only impediment to his qualification 
as an “employee” under the PSLRA was his confidential capacity.
However, it is not even clear how Dunsmuir qualified for such a designation. S. 
1 of the PSLRA distinguishes between persons automatically designated as “confiden­
tial” and those designated as “confidential” by collective agreement. Since Dunsmuir 
was not a member of a bargaining unit, nor a legal officer of the Attorney General, we can 
assume that his designation of “confidential capacity” would have fallen within s. 1 of
34 Courts o f  Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER C.43, s. 73(1). Note the wording and use of “appointed 
under” as meaning “subject to”.
35 Supreme Court Act, RSBC 1996, C.443, s. 13(1); the federal Supreme Court Act, S-26 R.S., c. S-19 
describes the duties, functions and terms of employment of the Registrar and other officers, but states in 
s. 12(1) that officers of the Court shall be appointed under the Public Service Appointment Act; Quebec 
legislation provides negatively which persons—notably judges—are not covered by public service 
legislation and the Code du travail. See Loi sur les tribunaux judiciaires, L.R.Q., chapitre T-16 s. 3.
36 Judicature Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2 (Alberta); Court o f Queen’s Bench Act, C.C.S.M. c. C280, ss. 12(1)-
15 (Manitoba); Judicature Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 240(Nova Scotia); Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 
F-7 does not speak of Registrars or Clerks but s. 12(5) says that prothonotaries are subject to the Public 
Service Superannuation Act', Saskatchewan provides special legislation for Court officials: the Court 
Officials Act, 1984, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. C-43.1. This Act does not mention whether they are subject to
the province’s Public Service Act, although it does speak of “court officials who are not employed in the 
Public Service”: see s. 20(l)(c).
37 Judicature Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. J-4 ss. 60(1) -  63(1) (Newfoundland and Labrador); Judicature Act, 
R.S.N.W.T. 1988,c.J-l ss. 61-66 (Northwest Territories); Supreme Court Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-10, ss. 
20.1 and 20.2 (Prince Edward Island); Judicature Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 128 ss. 39-45 (Yukon).
38 Supra note 27.
the PSLRA, which includes a person who “is employed in a position confidential to the 
Lieutenant-Governor, a Minister of the Crown, a judge of The Court of Queen’s Bench 
of New Brunswick, a judge of The Court of Appeal of New Brunswick, a judge of the 
Provincial Court of New Brunswick or the deputy head or the chief executive officer of 
any portion of the Public Service”.39 However, assuming that Dunsmuir was employed 
“to a judge” (i.e. a judge’s secretary) and therefore in confidential capacity, the “but 
for” in s. 101(1) exception means that confidentiality would have to be the only pos­
sible reason for excluding him from the scope of the PSLRA. Dunsmuir was not, how­
ever, appointed under the CSA nor is there any evidence that he was subject to that Act.
In any case, the only relevant provision in the CSA that seems to apply to 
Dunsmuir is s. 20, and yet the terms of his dismissal should have been found, in prin­
ciple at the very least, in the Acts that provide for the terms of his appointment—s. 
68(1) and (2) JA and s. 12(1) of the PC A.40 However, nothing is said in those Acts 
as to the terms of his dismissal. In the absence of any further such details, the next 
logical applicable provision would not be the CSA but the Interpretation Act, nota­
bly s. 20, which provides that “Every public officer now or hereafter appointed by 
or under the authority of an Act, or otherwise, shall remain in office during pleasure 
only, unless it is otherwise expressed in his commission or in the Act under or in 
pursuance of which he is appointed.”41 Section 20 of the IA therefore recognizes that 
some public servants may be outside the scope of the CSA. Applying the CSA to Dun­
smuir in regards to his termination negates any utility of the Interpretation Act (“IA ”)•
Recognizing that Dunsmuir was appointed and subject to legislation other 
than the CSA has two important consequences. First, he should not have been entitled 
to any right of grievance under the PSLRA since he is not an “employee” within the 
terms of that Act. Dunsmuir’s only recourse would have been to apply for judicial re­
view at the Court of Queen’s Bench and hope for reinstatement, or Crown liability for 
breach of contract (although the former recourse has now been excluded by the Court’s 
judgment). Dunsmuir should therefore not have been allowed to file a grievance under 
the PSLRA nor appeal to an adjudicator since such rights were reserved—for bet­
ter or for worse—for PSLRA employees. The second important consequence is that 
being within s. 20 of the IA means that Dunsmuir falls within the precise exception 
set out by the majority which gives rise to a duty of natural justice and entitlement 
to a hearing.42 According to the reasoning proposed, Dunsmuir is at the will of the 
Crown and employable “at pleasure”, and therefore subject to the very provision (s.
39 Persons within this category are specifically appointed under An Act Respecting the Office o f  the 
Attorney General, S.N.B., C. A-16.5, which was not the case of David Dunsmuir. Such persons would 
qualify under the PSLRA, supra note as “confidential employees” and therefore be entitled to file a 
grievance and request adjudication; PSLRA, s. 1, supra note 4.
40 “The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may appoint for each judicial district of the Trial Division of 
the Court of Queen’s Bench, a suitable person as clerk who shall perform and exercise within that judicial 
district all the duties, powers and authority of clerk prescribed by any Act, regulation or the Rules of 
Court.” See also s. 68(2) JA and s. 12(1) PC A, which provide identical terms of appointment.
41 Interpretation Act, CHAPTER 1-13, s. 20.
42 Infra note 55.
20 IA) the Court used to designate persons entitled to principles of natural justice.
However, according to the Court, Dunsmuir was not only an “office holder at 
pleasure” but equally a contractual employee.43 This hybrid status prevented him from 
being granted a hearing at common law.
PUBLIC SERVICE AND ENTITLEMENT TO COMMON LAWPROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS
On the surface, Dunsmuir appears to confirm the general role of procedural fairness 
(audi alteram partem) in Canadian administrative law. As the majority stated: “Proce­
dural fairness is a cornerstone of modem Canadian administrative law. Public decision 
makers are required to act fairly in coming to decisions that affect the rights, privileges 
or interests of an individual.”44 However, the Court stated that where there is a contract 
of employment, administrative law principles of procedural fairness will no longer 
apply. Thus, “public authority which dismisses an employee pursuant to a contract 
of employment should not be subject to any additional public law duty of fairness.”45
As such, all public service employees, whether they are under contract, statu­
tory office holders nominated by order in council, or hybrid contractual employee/ 
statutory office holders at pleasure such as Dunsmuir, are now subject to ordinary rules 
of contract law upon termination and not administrative law principles of procedural 
fairness. Thus, the right to a hearing, which until now had been described as a “cor­
nerstone” of administrative law, is set aside for civil servants, save in two situations:46
(1) Judges, ministers of the Crown and others who “fulfill 
constitutionally defined state roles”.47 The Court also stated 
a right to a hearing would also be applicable where the terms 
of appointment of some public office holders expressly 
provide for summary dismissal or, at the very least, are 
silent on the matter, in which case the office holders may be 
deemed to hold office “at pleasure” (see e.g. New Brunswick 
Interpretation Act, s. 20; Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. 1-21, s. 23(1)). Because an employee in this situation is 
truly subject to the will of the Crown, procedural fairness 
is required to ensure that public power is not exercised 
capriciously.”48
(2) A second exception occurs “when a duty of fairness flows 
by necessary implication from a statutory power governing
43 How exactly the Court came to the conclusion that Dunsmuir was an office holder “at pleasure”, 
without recognizing that he was subject to s. 20 IA is not clear.
44 Mullan, Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 79.
45 Ibid at para 112.
46 Ibid. at para 79.
47 Ibid. at para 115.
48 Ibid.
the employment relationship.”49 For instance, as the majority 
stated, where a statute provides for a duty to give notice 
before termination. In such cases, it is only logical that a 
right to a hearing be given.
It is not clear why Dunsmuir did not fall into any of the exceptions listed by 
the Court. On the one hand, it is clear that Dunsmuir’s position is not “constitution­
ally defined” as would be the Minister of Justice, for example. However, as an office 
holder at pleasure, he was truly subject to the will of the Crown, as defined by the 
majority in its first exception.50 The critical factor was that in addition to being an of­
fice holder “at pleasure”, Dunsmuir had a contract of employment. This hybrid status 
as both “office holder at pleasure” and contractual employee meant that Dunsmuir fell 
outside the realm of administrative law and natural justice, not because his contract 
might have provided for additional rights (we do not know if the contract did, but the 
facts suggest that it did not and that it was silent regarding the terms of his dismissal) 
but because he would have to comply with the rules of ordinary contract law, not 
administrative law. Moreover, the Court could have stated that Dunsmuir fell into 
the second exception and that his rights of grievance implied a prior hearing or were 
an application of the right to a hearing that occurred “by necessary implication” of 
the PSLRA. The majority could also have stated that Dunsmuir waived his right to a 
hearing by refusing his employer’s invitation to a meeting to discuss his dismissal.51
In creating these new exceptions, the court was coming back on a precedent 
that accorded a right to a hearing to contractual employees whose employment had 
“sufficient statutory flavor” in the Knight case.52 The court, however, did not go as far 
as overrule itself. As we shall see, while proclaiming procedural fairness to be a corner­
stone of administrative law, the court actually reversed the general rule. Indeed, proce­
dural fairness is no longer the principle, but the exception. The impact of Dunsmuir on 
procedural fairness is therefore much broader than the court was willing to concede.
5. The Real versus Proclaimed Impact of Dunsmuir on Procedural Fairness
Until Dunsmuir, administrative law had developed the doctrine of procedural fair­
ness by limiting its application to office holders dismissible for cause, as op­
posed to other employees. Over time, it crept and broadened its application.
In Ridge v. Balwin, Lord Morris proclaimed that an office holder’s right to a 
fair hearing prior to dismissal was “basic to our system”.53 The ratio of that case was 
based on Lord Reid’s tripartite classification: (i) master-servant relationships, (ii) of­
fices held “at pleasure”, and (iii) offices where there must be cause for dismissal. The
49 Ibid. at para 116.
50 Supra note 54.
51 Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para. 6.
52 Knight, supra note 22.
53 [1963] 2 All E.R. 66; [1964] AC at 114 [Ridge].
importance of that case was that it moved beyond the “acting judicially fallacy” to ex­
tend the duty to all office holders dismissible for cause, regardless of function of their 
employer (judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative).54 Over time, the classification has 
been read as distinguishing between contractual employees, office holders at pleasure, 
and office holders dismissible for cause, although nothing in the opinion suggests such 
interpretation.55 The critical idea, it seems, was the idea of subordination, especially 
since contractual employees could conceivably be dismissible for cause. However, 
rather than cause, the critical factor for allotting common law procedural fairness be­
came the status of the employee as “office holder”, versus that of contractual employee.
Nicholson c. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board o f Commissioners o f Po­
lice extended the Ridge precedent to Canada.56 Following an oral agreement, Nich­
olson had been serving on a twelve-month probationary basis. Two months after 
the end of his probation, that is, fourteen months into his employment, he received 
notice of termination. Police regulations, however, only provided a hearing prior to 
dismissal upon eighteen months of employment. It would have been natural to as­
sume that the parties had agreed to a shorter probationary period that required by 
statute and that the right to a hearing prior to dismissal came into effect upon the 
end of the probation period, but the employer did not give Nicholson such a ben­
efit. Laskin CJ, however, extended the right to a hearing by squeezing Nicholson into 
Lord Reid’s third category (requiring common law procedural fairness). This clas­
sification was accomplished by holding that a constable is the “holder of a police 
office”, thus qualifying as an “office holder”.57 Moreover, police regulations refer to 
the “office”, i.e. employment. Second, Laskin CJ considered that Nicholson was not 
purely “at pleasure” because that expression was not contained in police statutes and 
regulations. The idea of employment “at pleasure”, that is without reasons or notice 
of dismissal, was growing incongruent with modem administrative and employment 
law. As a result, the right to a hearing prior to eighteen months could not be interpret­
ed as excluded from the regulations, and was especially required given Nicholson’s 
promotion during his fourteen months of service. The four dissenting judges opined 
that Nicholson did not fit within the “office holder dismissible for cause” category, 
and moreover, that the regulations provided Nicholson with no right to a hearing.58
Nevertheless, Nicholson marked the beginning of a general wave of proce­
dural fairness that applied generally to the administrative decision-making process, 
although it did not alter the rule that only statutory office holders dismissible for cause
54 See generally Sir W. Wade, F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 9th ed. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2004) at 490 [Wade and Forsyth].
55 See Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 85.
56 [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 [.Nicholson].
57 Regulations spoke of the beginning of employment as beginning of “office”. See Nicholson, ibid.
58 Ibid. See dissenting opinion of Martland, Pigeon, Beetz and Pratte JJ.
have a right to a hearing.59 The next stage in procedural fairness in public servant 
dismissals was Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, which limited the im­
portance of the distinction between office holders and contractual employees.60 The 
right to procedural fairness was derived from the employer’s status as a public en­
tity drawing its powers from statute and therefore subject to general principles of ad­
ministrative law.61 In this case, the duty was not derived from the narrow context of 
the employment relationship, but from the general administrative duty to act fairly.
However, rather than allow a right to procedural fairness across the board, 
L’Heureux-Dubé J devised three criteria, through which a right to procedural fairness 
could be determined. First, the nature of the decision: was it final and specific, or pre­
liminary and general? Only in the first case should a right to a hearing be accorded. 
Secondly, L’Heureux-Dube J considered the relationship between the employer and 
the employee-master and servant or statutory office holder. L’Heureux-Dubé J re­
stated Lord Reid’s classification, concluding that because Knight was in the second 
category of office holder “at pleasure”, he was entitled to procedural fairness since 
that was the direction in which the law had been moving since Nicholson.62 Knight 
was indeed bound by contract, but he was an office holder since his position was 
not one of the “master and servant” category. Moreover, it was statutorily recognized 
and hierarchically important. The third factor to be considered was the impact of the 
decision on the employee. Although Knight’s employer was held to have followed 
its common law obligations of procedural fairness, the case is important because it 
imported the idea that the right to a hearing should be extended beyond office holders 
to contractual employees with sufficient “statutory flavor”, and even those dismis- 
sible without cause.63 The separate opinion held that there was no general common 
law duty of procedural fairness, only exceptions, and that the Board was not bound 
by any duty of fairness since Knight was an office holder “at pleasure” requiring 
no duty of procedural fairness could be imposed unless it was required by statute.64
Taking these precedents into account, it is possible to say that the Dunsmuir 
decision falls into a background of “creeping procedural fairness”. As a dual office 
holder and contractual employee, Dunsmuir would likely have been entitled to pro­
cedural fairness under the Knight precedent since his status as “office holder” would
59 Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602 (band council); Kane v.
Board o f Governors o f  the University o f  British Columbia, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1105 (tenured professor in 
relation to university three month suspension) ; Attorney General o f  Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat o f  Canada, 
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, [1980] 2 R.C.S. 735 (federal cabinet); Cardinal v. Director o f Kent Institution,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 643, 69 B.C.L.R. 255 (prison director); the House of Lords had already taken the step of 
imposing procedural fairness on employees “at pleasure”: see Malloch v. Aberdeen Cpn. [1971] 1WLR 
1578 [Malloch], holding that a school board could not dismiss a teacher, employable at pleasure, without 
according him a hearing. This case was even referred to at several instances in Dunsmuir, supra note 1.
60 Knight, supra note 22.
61 Ibid. at 668.
62 Note that the expression “at pleasure” in this case is being used as meaning a right to be dismissed with 
notice, rather than without, as was the case in Nicholson, supra note 64.
63 Knight, supra note 22 at para. 108.
64 Ibid. Per Wilson, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ.
have given his employment sufficient “statutory flavor” (especially had the JA and 
PCA been invoked). However, the Court did not follow the Knight precedent, stating 
that the office holder/contractual employee distinction is difficult to maintain both in 
principle and in practice.65 Moreover, if the Dunsmuir reasoning were applied to the 
facts in both Nicholson and Ridge v. Baldwin, neither employee in the latter two cases 
would be entitled to common law procedural fairness. In Ridge v. Baldwin, Mr. Ridge 
had been employed for thirty-three years and it is likely that he was engaged imme­
diately on purely contractual terms.66 Rather like David Dunsmuir, Ridge had been 
appointed to his office as deputy chief constable and there is nothing in the record to 
suggest that there had not been any contract between both parties. In many instances, 
their Lordships make reference to the law of contract, thereby recognizing Ridge’s 
contractual relationship with his employer. Thus, procedural fairness would not have 
been granted through common law principles, but only because it was provided for in 
a regulation. In contrast, a majority of three Lords who decided that case stated that the 
duty of procedural fairness would apply as a matter of common law, regardless of the 
content of the regulation. In Nicholson, it would also follow that the employee, under 
the Dunsmuir reasoning, would not be entitled to a hearing. Being of hybrid contrac­
tual or office holder status, Nicholson could not claim reinstatement but only damages 
in accordance with contract law principles. Therefore, putting the matters clearly and 
honestly, it is not only Knight, but equally Nicholson and also Ridge v. Baldwin that 
have been set aside.67
6. The Residual Role of Common Law Procedural Fairness in Public Service 
Employment
Having recognized that Dunsmuir does change much more than certain aspects of the 
Knight case and that it is not in fact specific to New Brunswick legislation, we can now 
move on to consider what role procedural fairness now plays in the public service.
The court only allowed for procedural fairness in two cases: (1) for constitu­
tionally defined roles, namely office holders truly at pleasure; (2) when it is required 
by statute or otherwise. Thus, rather than abolish the distinction between contractual 
employees and office holders, Dunsmuir simply raised the bar, so to speak, by stat­
ing that although most public servants are contractual employees, those at the top are 
not. This allows the Court to maintain Nicholson and Ridge v. Baldwin while severely 
limiting the impact of those cases. More important, constitutionally recognized office 
holders “at pleasure” receive broader protection because in Ridge and Nicholson, only 
office holders dismissible for cause were protected. Thus, since the vast majority of
65 First, it stated public offices are no longer the property of their holder; second, that dismissal of an 
office holder implicates delegated statutory power, whereas the dismissal of a contractual employee 
implicates the employer’s contracting power; third, office holders were seen as employed “at the pleasure” 
of government, and therefore susceptible of summary dismissal without any rights attached thereto (i.e. 
notice).Mullan, Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para. 83.
66 Ridge, supra note 60.
61 An Act Respecting the Office o f the Attorney General, S.N.B., C. A-16.5, s. 3(1).
employees can be viewed as having a contract of employment, common law proce­
dural fairness and reinstatement can be viewed as the exception rather than the rule. 
How the Court brought about such a reversal in a field that has been consistently de­
scribed as a “fundamental principle of English law” has yet to be properly explained.68
At the outset, we can only guess as to what exactly are “constitutionally 
defined roles”. The Constitution Act, 1867 is notoriously silent about many impor­
tant governmental roles. What then is a “constitutionally defined role”? Is the court 
referring to “important” roles? In the case of judges, there are either already spe­
cific regimes to protect such office holders from unwarranted dismissal, or, Minis­
ters that have traditionally been employable “at pleasure” and need not be granted 
a hearing for the loss of their position before the end of term.69 By convention, 
Ministers are responsible to the elected assemblies they represent and have abso­
lutely no right to their offices. Their status has long been regulated by convention 
although the Supreme Court is now saying that a Minister may request a hear­
ing prior to dismissal although the lowly civil servant cannot! Who exactly are 
they now to request a hearing with? The Prime Minister? The Governor General?
Moreover, even in situations where individuals are truly “at the pleasure” 
of the Crown and procedural fairness does apply, the standard has been so low that 
entitlement to procedural fairness means very little. In these situations, there are very 
few rights to protect.70 In any event, the distinction is based on the idea that pub­
lic servants in general—except those at the top qualifying as “office holders at plea­
sure”—negotiate the terms of their employment. At the same time, the Court itself 
recognized that the distinction between contractual employees and office holders was 
artificial and unworkable.71 Ironically, Knight had moved beyond the office holder/ 
contractual employee distinction by proposing a more factual and context specific 
approach to procedural fairness. However, the distinction lies in the perceived ab­
sence of a contract at higher levels of employment. At lower levels, it would seem, 
negotiation would be all the more possible and would afterwards discharge any com­
mon law duties of procedural fairness. Thus, whatever realism the law accorded to 
the employment of public servants, particularly those of more “permanent” status, 
such realism has now been lost in favour of the illusion of a contractual relationship 
where both parties are perceived as having the power to “cut a deal”. Even if this 
were the case, it would be difficult to conceive of a neutral and professional public 
service that is constituted solely in such a manner. If the common law tradition was 
criticized for regarding its public service “as if it still consisted of a handful of sec­
retaries working behind the scenes in a royal palace”, Dunsmuir has helped maintain
68 Rex v. North. Ex parte Oakey ([1927] 1 K.B. 491, 502; 53 T.L.R. 60, C.A., cited by Lord Morris of 
Borth-y-Gest in Ridge, supra note 60 at 107.
69 See for instance, s. 99(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867; the Supreme Court Act, S-26 R.S., c. S-19 s. 
9(1).
70 Martin v. Vancouver (City) 2008 BCCA 197; Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Minister o f  Education) 2008 
NSCA62.
71 Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 92.
that illusion.72 More important, though, is that the only members of the public ser­
vice that are now perceived as worth protecting are those at the top who are close 
to political power and thereforedo not have to openly compete for their position.
7. Reinstating Common Law Procedural Fairness in Public Service Employment
The contractualisation of public servants’ rights is not necessarily a cause for con­
cern since unionized public servants are protected against dismissal without cause 
and provided that a right to unionize is available.73 Until Dunsmuir, the issue was 
not whether common law procedural fairness existed, but whether procedure was in 
fact fair. The general criticism made of the law, however, was that it was incoher­
ent. That said, it was never said why that should be a problem since fairness was 
in fact specific. Attempts to systematize the law are therefore based on raised ex­
pectations of coherence to the detriment of fairness and thus lead to greater dissat­
isfaction. Some authors argue that the distinction should not be between employees 
dismissible with cause and those dismissible without, but between office holders 
and contractual employees.74 In other words, all office holders (at pleasure or dis­
missible for cause) should be entitled to procedural fairness; contractual employees 
should not.75 This distinction, however, was precisely what was made in Dunsmuir, 
although the bar was simultaneously moved so as to exclude most public servants 
from the ambit of procedural fairness. Moreover, it is not even clear what the dis­
tinction between office holder and contractual employee is supposed to represent.
It is important to remember that the development of procedural fairness 
was intended to keep the public sector up to date with developments in collective 
negotiation, but also to provide an example to the private sector.76 In earlier cases 
such as Ridge v. Baldwin, the right to notice (or payment in lieu) had not yet made 
its appearance in contract law. Thus, neither “employment at pleasure” nor contract 
law provided damages in lieu of notice.77 Procedural fairness was therefore a limita­
tion on government’s power of dismissal. Nowadays, taking into account the gen­
eral protection of unionized employees through termination for cause, one would 
imagine that the trend would be to recognize a general public law requirement of 
cause for the termination of public service employees. The position in Dunsmuir, 
however, has been to view the administrative law as providing a bare minimum of
72 Wade and Forsyth, supra note 62 at 62.
73 According to the OECD, 86 percent of Canadian public service employees were unionized in 2007: 
<www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/40/39400468.pdf>; see Jody Freeman & Martha Minow (eds.) Government 
by Contract -  Outsourcing and American Democracy, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) 
stating that the contractualisation of government should neither be applauded nor be a cause for panic.
74 Wade and Forsyth, supra note 62 at 545.
75 For support of this position, see D. J. Mullan, J. M. Evans, Administrative Law -  Cases, Text and 
Materials, 5th ed. (Emond Montgomery: Toronto, 2003) at 120.
76 “A private employer may act in secret but a responsible elected public body can hardly do so.” Lord 
Reid, in Malloch, supra note 68.
77 See generally Molot, “Employment During Good Behaviour or at Pleasure” (1989) 2 C.J.A.L.P. 238 
[Molot].
protection, that is, one that is dictated by the lowest common denominator available 
in the private sector. However, unionization is much more accessible in the private 
sectior, which gives some public servants such as Dunsmuir even less protection.
As was well known, procedural fairness in the public service was intended 
to act as a countervailing power to government’s unilateral power of dismissal. Proce­
dural fairness was not a guarantee of immovability, but a minimal guarantee of neu­
trality of the public service—the permanent aspect of Canadian government. In theory, 
the dismissal of a public servant should be reviewable under traditional grounds of 
reasonableness, bad faith and irrelevant considerations since it qualifies as an admin­
istrative “decision”. However, doing so would alter the common law rule allowing an 
employer to dismiss an employee immediately with notice or payment in lieu, at least 
in the public sector. Procedural fairness is therefore a compromise between imposing 
dismissal for cause and total judicial deference to governmental employment policy.
Founded on legitimate expectations and fair play, procedural fairness is not 
an absolute, but rather a variable right intimately connected to fair treatment and pur­
porting to fill any possible legislative gaps.78 Procedural fairness is therefore not that 
different from the duty to exercise discretionary power reasonably, rather than ar­
bitrarily. Moreover, as some have stated, procedural fairness is not a duty to give 
reasons, but a duty to state the case that has to be met.79 The reasoning in Dunsmuir, 
however, is not that public servants are already adequately protected—indeed Dun­
smuir does not have as much protection as unionized employees—but that the re­
lationship is contractual rather than unilateral as in the case of appointed statutory 
office holders. While the Court recognized a variable duty on the part of government 
in terms of independence and impartiality of administrators (not to mention that pro­
cedural fairness is itself a variable duty), Dunsmuir provides a Manichean division 
between no common law right to natural justice (most public servants) and an excep­
tional right for those at the top who are termed office holders of the “pure” variety.
The value of the office holder/contractual employee distinction, however, has 
slowly been decreasing. In the past, office holders were considered proprietors of their 
office and hence entitled to it if deprived of it. The term “office holder” has traditionally 
implied the possibility of enforcing one’s rights through judicial review—i.e. reinstate­
ment as opposed to only damages.80 The office holder-contractual employee distinction 
was also maintained by viewing the Crown as having special prerogatives in employ-
78 St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1170,75 D.L.R. (4th) 385;
Re Canada Assistance Plan, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 297; Baker v. Canada (Minister o f  
Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at paras. 26 & 29 ; Mount Sinai 
Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister o f  Health and Social Services), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281, 2001 CSC 41 
at paras. 22-38 (minority opinion) ; Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC 11, 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 249 at para78; Fumell v. Whangarei High Schools Board, [1973] A.C. 660 at 679, cited in 
Nicholson, supra note 64 and Knight, supra note 22.
79 Wade & Forsyth, supra note 62 at 544..
80 Wade and Forsyth, supra note 62 at 543-545.
ment relations. Termination “at pleasure” was founded on the Crown’s prerogative not 
to bind itself.81 As a result, “office holders at pleasure” are generally described as hav­
ing no right to notice prior to dismissal. Combining such a prerogative with the propri­
etary origins of public offices, the office holder/ contractual employee distinction was 
solidified. It is from this perspective that viewing employment with the Crown as “con­
tracted” could be seen as an advance.82 The evolution of the law, however, has eroded 
many of the practical distinctions between office holders and contractual employees.
It is well recognized that the exercise of state contracting power finds its 
legal origins in common law, not prerogative power.83 Just as there is no distinct 
droit administratif founded on separate and special considerations that do not ap­
ply in private law relations, there should be no special category of public servants 
that are “above” the ordinary law, except insofar as provided by statute. Thus, with 
the advance of contract law, the term “at pleasure” has been subject to variable 
meanings and it is not even clear at present if it means “no right to notice”.84 If the 
term does appear in statutes, it must be remembered that they must be read inso­
far as possible as complying with the common law, not as going against it. In any 
case, there is no general minimal period of notice; notice varies customarily from 
sector to sector. It follows that it is difficult to read a statute containing the mere 
expression “at pleasure” as derogating from the common law. Contractual employ­
ment and office holder status should therefore not be seen as differences in nature 
but differences of degree, or of level of employment. Thus, as was the case prior to 
Dunsmuir, employment relationships with government were considered as contracts 
in which statute and regulation were, in variable degrees, implicitly incorporated.85
Moreover, while courts have long recognized a right to a hearing for mem­
bers of associations and quasi-public collective organizations, common law proce­
dural fairness is no longer applicable to members of the public service.86 The question
81 R. Dussault, L. Borgeat, Traité de droit adminsitratif, vol. II (Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 
1986) at 258.
82 “The movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract”: Maine, 
Ancient Law, Pollock, ed., at 174, cited in Molot, infra note 81 at 238.
83 P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law o f Canada (Toronto: Carswell, Looseleaf ed.) at para. 19..
84 However, the Court stated that the expression “at pleasure” contained in a contract or statute could 
withdraw, by necessary implication, the duty to pay damages for lack of notice. Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at 
para 97, citing P. W. Hogg and P. J. Monahan, Liability o f the Crown (3rd ed. 2000) at 240. This, however, 
goes against the trend of reading “at pleasure” as requiring notice of variable length. See for instance, 
Knight, supra note 22, where both minority and majority qualified Knight’s employment as “at pleasure”, 
even though he was entitled to 3 months notice upon termination.
85 Attorney General o f Quebec v. Labrecque et a l, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 1057, 125 D.L.R. (3d) 545 at 1082.
86 Lakeside Colony ofHutterian Brethren v. Hofer, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165, 97 D.L.R. (4th) 17, holding that 
a Hutterite community had violated principles of natural justice in expelling one of its members without 
providing a hearing. See generally D. Mullan, Administrative Law (Irwin Law: Toronto, 2001) at 23-26 
[Mullan, Administrative Law]; see also Struchen v. Burrard Yacht Club 2008 BCCA 271 - regarding the 
reinstatement of a Yacht Club member following a disagreement with the club. The Court of Appeal stated 
that the Supreme Court of British Columbia failed to consider a “vital factor” - whether the Board had 
prejudged the matter and failed to give the appellant an opportunity to respond. It is difficult not to regard 
such a relationship as contractual.
is not why government ought not be subject to the same rules as the private sector 
(employment at will). The question is why the government ought to be required to 
abide by procedural fairness, not only by common law tradition, but equally by con­
stitutional obligation, with regard to the public as users of government services, but 
not in relation to those who serve within it? One would imagine that the lowest com­
mon denominator would not set the standard of fairness, but equally, that within the 
public sector itself, fairness would be at least as demanding as what is required of it as 
concerns the public at large.87 Recent case law demonstrates a total lack of direction 
by lower courts on where to take the Dunsmuir ruling. Some courts have followed 
the precedent, while others have simply gone on determining whether principles of 
procedural fairness have been followed.88 In this respect, moving back to Knight and 
the considerations of criteria such as the weighing of the employee’s position and the 
impact of the decision would restore both flexibility and fairness, although it may not 
be as simple as the general rule offered in Dunsmuir. Nevertheless, it would restore the 
general coherence in procedural fairness that exists with regard to the general public. 
89 The law need not be squeezed into orderly categories.
JUDICIAL REMEDIATION OF ARBITRARY DISMISSAL OF PUBLIC 
SERVANTS
Aside from the distinction between “contractual employees” and office holders “pure­
ly at pleasure”, an even greater problem now stems from the remediation of civil 
servants’ dismissals. Dunsmuir confirms the general rule that public servants are sub­
ject to ordinary rules of contract and also that public servants could be both contrac­
tual employees and office holders.90 What Dunsmuir does change, however, is that 
“hybrid” public servants no longer have the choice between contract and administra­
tive law; all must now seek judicial intervention through the application of “ordi­
nary contractual remedies”. Dunsmuir nevertheless does provide a right to a hear­
87 See however, Quebec v. Cyr, 2008 SCC 13, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 338, holding that an employee, whose 
employer had been engaged by contract by government to inspect vehicles, was entitled to a hearing 
before government removed his name from a list of inspectors. Such removal would have meant his 
dismissal. He was therefore entitled to a hearing before government because he had no contract with it.
88 See for instance Redmond v. Hamilton (City), 244 O.A.C. 391 2008, where the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice (Divisional Court), invoking the Dunsmuir precedent, stated that the dismissal of city employees 
was not subject to judicial review and procedural fairness. See also Marc Forest c. Ville de Varennes, C.A. 
Qc. le 17 Novembre 2008 (32938). Leave to appeal dimissed without reasons: [2008] C.S.C.R. no. 537. 
However, the promotion and hiring of government employees still appears to be subject to administrative 
law principles of procedural fairness: see Baragar v. Canada (Attorney General) 2008 FCA 841 - although 
it is not clear in this case whether there was in fact a contract of employment between the applicant and 
the government, the Federal Court agreed to review a decision not to promote the applicant. One case
to keep an eye on is Dalstrom v. British Columbia (Organized Crime Agency) 2008 BCSC [Dais from] 
regarding the dismissal of a police officer, allowing an application for judicial review to proceed in order 
to obtain a possible reinstatement.
89 See L’Heureux-Dubé J’s opinion in Baker v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 
2 S.C.R. 817,174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Baker\, which listed non exhaustive criteria for determining the 
public’s right to a hearing, building upon those established in Knight, supra note 22.
90 See for instance Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199.
ing and general subjection to administrative law and judicial review of office holders 
“truly at pleasure” who are not bound in any way by contract to the Crown. Persons 
“performing constitutionally defined roles” and select senior public servants “at plea­
sure” may nevertheless seek judicial review and reinstatement. As the Court stated,
The starting point, therefore, in any analysis, should be to determine the 
nature of the employment relationship with the public authority (...) A 
public authority which dismisses an employee pursuant to a contract of 
employment should not be subject to any additional public law duty of 
fairness. Where the dismissal results in a breach of contract, the public 
employee will have access to ordinary contractual remedies.91
This statement can be interpreted in two ways. At face value, it indicates 
that all public service employees unionized or not, will only be entitled to private 
law contractual remedies if they are dissatisfied with the outcome of their grievances 
and adjudication. This result would be a radical outcome, although it can be read 
from the courts’ opinion. A second reading would be to limit the application to per­
sons such as David Dunsmuir, that is, non-unionized public servants with or without 
rights of grievance. It is difficult to accept the first interpretation and most optimists 
would accept the latter. It is also difficult to assume that the remediation aspect of 
the judgment only applies to public servants in Dunsmuir’s non unionized category.
Until Dunsmuir, the premise of judicial review of arbitral rulings has 
been that these should generally be regarded as the expression of statutory power, 
not private consent. Where arbitration is not the sole method of resolving a dispute, 
its nature has been held as consensual, not statutory.92 Therefore, Dunsmuir could 
be read as coming back on this idea insofar as labor arbitrators might now be re­
garded as consensual private tribunals, not statutory bodies.93 However, this has 
not been the case. There has even been much confusion and contradiction on how 
to deal with the dismissal of contractual employees who do not fall into the excep­
tions listed by the Court. Courts have taken contradictory positions, and seemingly 
in some cases have totally ignored the position taken in Dunsmuir that public sec­
tor contractual employees are not entitled to seek judicial review of their dismissal.94
91 Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para. 113. However, at para 114 the majority seemed to insinuate otherwise: 
“Where a public employee is protected from wrongful dismissal by contract, his or her remedy should be 
in private law, not in public law.” A contrario, does the silence of one’s contract imply a right to public 
law remedies?
92 D.J.M. Brown, D.M. Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration (Aurora: Canada Law Book, Loose-Leaf 
ed.) at para 1: 5100.
93 See Port Author Shipbuilding Co. v. Arthurs [1969] S.C.R. 85, 90-94
94 See for instance Dalstrom, supra note 88 allowing judicial review for the dismissal of a contractual 
employee. Compare Bansal v. Stringam 2009 ABCA 87. that a non unionized university employee was 
not entitled to procedural fairness prior to dismissal, nor even to judicial review given that his action was 
barred by a privative clause and he did not demonstrate that he was unionized employee who could benefit 
from arbitration. Compare Kane v. Bd. o f  Governors ofU.B.C., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1105 -  which makes no 
mention of the professor’s status.
The Dunsmuir ruling also weakens the scope of judicial powers of remedia­
tion. As the Court stated, Dunsmuir should only have been able to seek damages, not 
judicial review.95 From an administrative law point of view, the annulment of his dis­
missal entitles the employee to reinstatement where government violates procedural 
fairness.96 However, even where the dismissal of a civil servant has been quashed, courts, 
addressing identical concerns raised by specific performance in a private law context, 
have not always followed through with the logic of reinstatement.97 Damages, ordinary 
but also aggravated, can now be given to the victim of a breach of contract for violation 
of principles of good faith.98 Reinstatement, however, is now virtually out of the ques­
tion because specific performance is not available in the context of contracts of service 
whether they are for determinate or indeterminate periods, terminable for cause or not.99
Moreover, even where a contractual employee or hybrid officer/contractual 
employee dismissible with cause, or dismissed without cause, are we to assume they 
must only seek damages, since specific performance is not available in the context of 
contracts of service? Is this also the case where the employee has a defined mandate? 
Dunsmuir not only lessens the protection of office holders “at pleasure” such as Dun­
smuir but also weakens the protection of those dismissable with cause since they may 
no longer avail themselves of reinstatement normally available in administrative law.
Indeed, as Holmes famously wrote, “The duty to keep a contract at com­
mon law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it — 
and nothing else.”100 Even in the private sector, the Court has long recognized that 
adjudicator decisions are subject to judicial review and the Charter.101 Speaking of 
“ordinary contract remedies” thus implies the application of the “ordinary law” ap­
plicable to private individuals. Are we to assume that the Charter no longer has a 
role to play in the exercise of administrative discretion to terminate a public servant’s 
employment? In an oft-quoted passage of Baker, L’Heureux-Dubé J stated that dis­
cretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, 
the principles of the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamen­
tal values of Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter.102 However, fol­
lowing the reasoning in Dunsmuir, the only constraint on administrative discretion
95 This would also apply to the government, who like in the Dunsmuir case, may want to apply for 
judicial review of the adjudicator’s decision.
96 Mullan, Administrative Law supra note 91 at 230.
97 Ibid. at 16. However, this does not imply that reinstatement is altogether excluded: see Murphy v. 
Ontario (A.G.) (1996), 28 O.R. (3d) 220 (G.D.); contra Hewat c. Ontario (1998), 37 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.) 
and Dewar v. Ontario (1998), 37 O.R. (3d) 170 (C.A.). In this last case, the court allowed the parties to 
negotiate the terms of the settlement.
98 Wallace c. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701, 152 D.L.R. (4th) 1. A duty of good faith 
was explicitly recognised by the Supreme Court in RBC Dominion Securities Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Canada 
Inc., 2008 SCC 54.
99 See generally J. D. McCamus, The Law o f Contracts (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 931.
100 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457 at 462.
101 Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
102 Baker, supra note 82 at para. 56.
is the duty to provide adequate notice (or payment in lieu thereof) for termination. 
Since judicial review is no longer available, bad faith, capriciousness and other mo­
tives can no longer be kept in check through procedural fairness and judicial review.
Until now, with commentaries focusing on the standard of review, the con­
sensus appeared to be that Dunsmuir does very little violence to the holding and prin­
ciples articulated in Baker.103 Indeed, Baker was interpreted as a judicial mandate to 
look more closely at the exercise of administrative discretion, to consider the reasons 
for decisions, to consider non-binding administrative directives and circulars and in­
ternationally ratified treaties, which nevertheless would inform the interpretation of 
statutory discretion. The necessary vehicle for such intervention is judicial review 
—by definition a “public law remedy”. However, when we look not only at the let­
ter but also at the spirit of Dunsmuir and Baker they are very different, especially 
when we remember that neither deals exclusively with the question of standards of 
review. Indeed, Baker reminded governments that discretionary powers are subject 
to the Charter and could be reversed under s. 32(1) of the Charter. Moreover, Baker 
articulated an integrated vision of administrative law and the Charter and the idea that 
the exercise of administrative discretion was subject to reasonableness and judicial 
review. Dunsmuir does not speak explicitly of Charter principles, but by withdrawing 
judicial review and replacing it with “ordinary contractual remedies”, it is difficult to 
see how the Charter cannot be part of such a withdrawal. Whether the courts develop 
a doctrine of “constitutional torts” is beside the point: damages will always be a lesser 
remedy than reinstatement. Thus, by offering private law remediation instead of what 
has until now been public law means of redress, the Court is surreptitiously dissociat­
ing many fundamental legal principles that have long been a part of the public service.
In the context of private law, judges have long avoided inquiring—public 
policy considerations aside—into the “reasonableness” of a contractual relationship 
through the doctrine of freedom of contract. However, in relation to public authorities, 
absolute discretion has long been viewed as inappropriate.104 Dunsmuir establishes 
absolute discretion (though with the possibility of paying damages) whereas Baker is 
founded on its control through the doctrine of reasonableness. In this respect, the dif­
ference in spirit between Dunsmuir and Baker could not be greater.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear how exactly the new scheme for the remedia­
tion of public service employee termination is supposed to work. On the one hand, the 
Court recognizes that public servants have statutory rights of appeal to an adjudicator. 
On the other, it withdraws the possibility of judicial review of the adjudicator’s deci­
103 Mullan, Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at 120.
104 Wade and Forsyth, supra note 62 at 355. These authors cite French administrative authorities Vedel 
and Devolvé, who state: "En droit privé un particulier peut agir par raison, par intérêt, par générosité, 
par caprice ; le contrôle du juge ne s’exercera qu’a rencontre d’un but illicite ou immoral. Au contraire, il 
n’existe pas en droit administratif de principe d’autonomie de la volonté. La volonté de l’Administration 
n’est pas autonome ; l’Administration ne doit se décider que pour des raisons de fait ou de droit ayant 
existence objective réelle et adéquates à l’acte fait." Droit administratif, 12th ed. at 328.
sion. A problem may now arise where employees appeal their dismissal to an arbitrator 
and thereafter find themselves in court, either as applicant or defendant. How exactly a 
Court can address the adjudicator’s decision, if it is contrary to what the employer has 
decided, is not clear. Normally, in an application for judicial review, the adjudicator’s 
decision would be the very subject of the proceedings. It could be quashed although 
judicial intervention is now centered on assessing damages. If an adjudicator orders 
reinstatement—as in Dunsmuir’s case—how exactly is the employer supposed to ad­
dress the question of reinstatement if damages are the only applicable remedy? In light 
of this, it now seems that judicial review will continue to play a role where there is a 
statutory right of appeal before an arbitrator, unless courts decide to enforce privative 
clauses, in contradiction of long standing authority to the contrary.105
In this respect, it is worth questioning whether the Dunsmuir case has weak­
ened the status of public servants. The counterweight, it seems, would be collective 
bargaining. This argument would presume that the public servants in question are cov­
ered by such agreements and are entitled to seek remediation thereunder. However, 
this presumption is far from being the case of Clerks and legal personnel.106 We can 
even inquire as to whether the recent abrupt dismissal of Crown prosecutors is a prod­
uct of the Dunsmuir precedent.107 It is therefore possible to see how a lack of collective 
bargaining coverage or at least protection against dismissal without cause would en­
able a government to surround itself with favorable legal opinions and, in the image of 
what has happened under Alberto Gonzales, enable the dismissal of lawyers refusing 
to toe the official party line. Nothing short of political fallout seems to prevent this 
from happening now in Canada.
CONCLUSION
While the Dunsmuir decision merged “patent unreasonableness” and “reasonableness 
simpliciter”, its greatest effect on administrative law is arguably not on standards of 
review. Indeed, the Dunsmuir decision took the extraordinary step not of confirming 
that public servants are bound by contract to their employer, something that has long 
been recognised, but of establishing that public servants are no longer subject to ad­
ministrative law; with the exception, to put it succinctly, of those at the top.
In this respect, the Dunsmuir decision and its perceived impact on adminis­
trative law demonstrates the growing disjuncture between administrative reality and 
administrative law. From a legal standpoint, Dunsmuir provided an excellent oppor­
tunity to either recognize the subsidiary nature of principles of natural justice in the 
public service and how the common law could be used to “fill in” statutory gaps,
105 See Crevier v. A.G. (Quebec) et al., [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220, regarding a privative clause to protect 
Quebec’s Professions Tribunal from judicial review.
106 The Director of Prosecution is solely protected against dismissal. See An Act Respecting the Office o f  
the Attorney General, supra note 35 at s. 4(2).
107L ’AcadieNouvelle (5 September 2008) 9.
where necessary. However, the case does not appear to have been properly argued and 
the solution is very weak in justification. Its bottom line is that there are no gaps to fill 
since administrative law generally has no business in the public service. As a result, 
some public servants such as Dunsmuir will be allowed to fall through the cracks if 
they are not unionized and do not qualify for protection against dismissal without 
cause and such persons do not even fall under the Court’s exception of employees 
“truly at pleasure”. In doing so, it would seem that they bring much of the public 
service with them—except to Minister and Judges—given that administrative law and 
judicial review are no longer supposed to play a role in the public service. In this 
respect, Dunsmuir demonstrates how administrative law has become so disconnected 
with the realities of public administration that Ministers and other “constitutionally 
defined roles” are now seen as entitled to hearings upon dismissal whereas public 
servants all the way up the ladder are not. Such disconnect is all the more highlighted 
by the predominance of conceptual debates about standards of review that have been 
reignited in the wake of Dunsmuir.
Regardless of whether we believe standards of review necessary to resolve 
issues of natural justice, the change from “patent unreasonableness” to “reasonable­
ness” is arguably of collateral significance. Even if one believes that Dunsmuir was 
subject to the CSA, why was there so little argument on this issue by the parties? Why 
was his appointment under the Judicature and Probate Court Acts not even part of 
the record and the jurisdiction of the adjudicator and grievance not even addressed as 
part of the debate? Much time and effort was given at every step of the dispute to first 
define the standard of review before turning to the issue of procedural fairness. Indeed, 
even at the highest level, the Court made much effort to debate the different types of 
reasonableness, but comparatively little justification or even explanation was given 
in regard to the rather seismic changes brought about in the law of natural justice.
In the end, should Dusmuir have been entitled to a hearing? First, Dunsmuir 
had rights of appeal that might have “cured” any possible prior violation of procedural 
fairness. As stated earlier, Dunsmuir declined his employer’s invitation to a meet­
ing on 21 July 2004 until he could receive legal advice. His letter of dismissal was 
sent thereafter directly to his employer and no meeting was held. Whether he actually 
waived his right to a hearing is not clear, although it is more likely that his employer 
“jumped the gun” by simply addressing his legal representative by mail and not call­
ing for another meeting. This is unfortunate because Dunsmuir did not appear to be 
doing a good job even though his employer did decide to engage his services at the 
end of his probationary term. Did his rights of appeal “cure” the Crown’s violation 
of principles of procedural fairness? The lower courts were divided on that question. 
However, if we continue to assume that Dunsmuir should not only have been excluded 
from making such appeals under the PSLRA, but also that the adjudicator did not have 
jurisdiction to consider the issue afresh but simply to determine whether appropriate 
notice had been given, it is more than likely that the principles of procedural fairness
had not been followed.108 Such rights of appeal on limited technical questions (rather 
than a de novo hearing) would never have had any curative effect on any initial viola­
tion of procedural fairness. Thus it seems that in either case, Dunsmuir should have 
been entitled to a hearing.
However, it remains the legislature’s responsibility, not the courts’, nor the 
parties litigating their case before them, to provide clear legal regimes and rights for 
the individuals who serve under their governments. In this respect, it seems like as 
good a time as any to update New Brunswick’s Civil Service Act to a new Public 
Service Act that would provide identical benefits to the Province’s clerks, registrars, 
government lawyers and other concerned public servants against summary dismissal 
without necessarily unionizing them.
108 Harelkin v. University o f Regina [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561.
